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ABSTRACT 
 
Keenan M. Jenkins: Challenging observed prejudice: Testing the roles of goal intentions and 
implementation intentions  
(Under the direction of Paschal Sheeran) 
 
 Confronting prejudice is an effective way to reduce further prejudice, especially when 
that confrontation comes from an observer. Past research has shown that observers of prejudice 
often fail to confront, and numerous studies examine the reasons why people fail to confront. 
However, there is little research on how to increase rates of observer confrontation. Research on 
self-regulation suggests that implementation intentions – if-then plans to automatize behavior in 
response to situational cues – are an effective way to bridge the gap between intentions and 
behaviors; this should also hold true when it comes to bridging the gap between intending to and 
actually confronting prejudice. One hundred thirty-eight White participants completed an online 
survey in which they received an implementation intention, a goal intention, or no intention to 
confront prejudice. In a behavioral follow-up, participants were given the opportunity to verbally 
confront a White confederate whom they heard make a racially prejudiced remark about a Black 
confederate. Subsequently, participants were asked to choose one of the confederates for a 
partner task. Results from hierarchical logistic regressions showed that goal intentions, rather 
than implementation intentions, led to an increase in rates of verbal confrontation. However, 
neither goal intentions nor implementations affected partner choice. Across all conditions, over 
75% of participants selected the Black confederate as a partner, suggesting a ceiling effect. The 
results suggest that in the domain of confronting prejudice, goal intentions suffice, whereas 
implementation intentions may induce deliberation at the critical moment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
If we accept and acquiesce in the face of discrimination, we accept the responsibility ourselves. 
We should, therefore, protest openly everything … that smacks of discrimination or slander. 
 
– Mary McLeod Bethune, What the Negro Wants, 1944 
Minorities face prejudice frequently (Kessler, Mickleson, & Williams, 1999; Seaton, 
Caldwell, Sellers, & Jackson, 2008) – at both the systematic level (e.g., laws and policies that 
disproportionately and disadvantageously affect Black Americans) and the interpersonal level 
(e.g., prejudiced comments). There is a large literature devoted to laboratory methods of 
reducing both explicit and implicit prejudice (e.g., Lai, Hoffman, & Nosek, 2013; Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006; Vescio, Secrhist, & Paolucci, 2003; for a review, see Paluck & Green, 2009). 
However, one understudied behavioral means of prejudice reduction is confronting prejudice. 
Confronting prejudice is the act of  “verbally or nonverbally expressing one’s dissatisfaction 
with prejudicial and discriminatory treatment to the person who is responsible for making the 
remark or behavior” (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006, p. 67) and is known to be 
effective in reducing subsequent expressions of prejudice (e.g., Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006; 
Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Dickter, Kittel, & Gyurovski, 2012; Mallet & Wagner, 2011).  
Previous research on confronting prejudice has mostly examined the prevalence of 
confrontation and reasons why people fail to confront prejudice, rather than suggesting ways to 
encourage people to confront prejudice. The current dissertation begins by examining this past 
research on confronting prejudice – specifically, the reasons that targets (i.e., people toward 
whom prejudice is directed) and observers often fail to confront perpetrators (i.e., those who 
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exhibit prejudice), as well as the effectiveness of observer confrontation (i.e., confrontation by 
those who witness prejudice). Next, I borrow from self-regulation research on bridging the gap 
between intentions and behavior to guide my hypothesis that an implementation intention 
intervention should increase rates of confronting prejudice. Then, this hypothesis is subjected to 
an empirical test using a longitudinal, behavioral study conducted over two sessions.  
Existing Research on Confronting Prejudice 
 Research has suggested that confronting prejudice is an effective way to reduce 
subsequent prejudice. Czopp and colleagues (2006) found that after being confronted about their 
prejudice, perpetrators showed less stereotyping on subsequent tasks and reported less prejudiced 
attitudes. Similarly, men are more likely to point out sexist language and engage in 
compensatory behavior after being confronted about their sexism (Mallett & Wagner, 2011). 
What makes confronting prejudice effective? Research by Czopp and Monteith (2003) suggests 
that confronting prejudice elicits guilt in perpetrators. The Self-Regulation of Prejudice model 
(Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002; Monteith, Mark, & Ashburn-
Nardo, 2010) suggests that guilt is one of the many types of self-directed negative affect that 
leads to the regulation (i.e., suppression) of prejudiced responses. Further, observer confrontation 
reduces prejudice by emphasizing a norm of anti-prejudice. Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, and 
Vaughn (1994) found that when one person expresses disagreement with prejudiced attitudes, 
other bystanders also expressed more anti-prejudice attitudes (see also Crandall, Eshleman, & 
O’Brien, 2002; Crandall & Stangor, 2005; McDonald & Crandall, 2015). 
 Even though confronting prejudice is an effective way to reduce prejudice, it is an 
uncommon occurrence. Past research suggests that when people have the opportunity to confront 
prejudice, they do so less than 50% of the time whether they are targets (e.g., Hyers, 2007; Swim 
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& Hyers, 1999; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 
2001) or observers of the respective prejudice (e.g., Dickter & Newton, 2013). Even when 
people predict that they will confront prejudice, they fail to do so when given the opportunity 
(e.g., Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009; Shelton & Stewart, 
2004). Targets may not confront prejudice if they believe that their challenge will not be 
effective (Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2012; Rattan & Dweck, 2010) – that is, they believe 
it will not change the perpetrator’s prejudiced attitudes. Further, targets may face negative 
interpersonal consequences if they confront (Shelton & Stewart, 2004). Targets of prejudice who 
confront the perpetrator may be disliked (Czopp et al., 2006), or labeled as complainers (Kaiser 
& Miller, 2001, 2003), overreactors (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), or rude (Rasinski & Czopp, 
2010). Confrontations by targets are “likely to be taken less seriously and discounted as a typical 
and trivial cry of prejudice” (Czopp & Monteith, 2003, p. 542).  
Similarly, observers often fail to confront prejudice because they anticipate high response 
costs; they fear negative evaluations from perpetrators and other observers (i.e., being perceived 
as rude or impolite), and they fear negative interpersonal consequences such as retaliation from 
the perpetrator (Dickter, 2012; Dickter & Newton, 2013). However, these fears, which decrease 
observers’ motivation to confront prejudice, are unfounded. In fact, the response costs of 
observer confrontation are low; observers who confront prejudice garner more respect and are 
better liked than observers who do not confront (Dickter et al., 2012; Drury & Kaiser, 2014; 
Gulker, Mark, & Monteith, 2013). Observers are also more effective at reducing prejudice than 
are targets who confront (Dickter et al., 2012; Drury & Kaiser, 2014; but see also Czopp et al., 
2006). The burden of confronting prejudice is often placed on the targets of prejudice, even 
though their claims of discrimination are usually dismissed. Rasinski and Czopp (2010) 
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suggested that observer confrontation is surprising (i.e., observers have no vested interest in 
confronting prejudice), which may make such confrontation more effective. Further, Czopp and 
Monteith (2003) stated that observer confrontation “elicited more guilt from participants yet 
simultaneously made them feel less tense and uneasy than a target’s confrontation. Although 
(and perhaps because) they are surprising, observer confrontations may provide a nonthreatening 
atmosphere for recipients to appreciate the confrontation message” (p. 542).  
Inclined Abstainers: The Failure to Follow Through on Intentions 
  A meta-analysis of meta-analyses by Sheeran (2002) found that intentions only account 
for 28% of the variance in future behavior, indicating a gap between intentions and behavior. 
Similarly, Gollwitzer’s (1990; 2010) mindset theory of action phases suggests that being 
motivated to act does not necessarily spur action. Sheeran (2002; see also Sheeran & Orbell, 
2000) suggested that inclined actors (i.e., people who intend to act and then do so) and inclined 
abstainers (i.e., people who intend to act and then fail to do so) do not significantly differ on 
intentions, attitudes, subjective norms, or perceived behavioral control. This indicates that while 
intentions may be consistent across actors and abstainers, intentions alone are not enough to 
predict behavior.  
This intention-behavior gap exists with respect to confronting prejudice – that is, a 
number have studies have shown that intentions to confront prejudice do not predict actual 
confrontation of prejudice. For example, Brinkman, Garcia, and Rickard (2011) found that 
women self-reported wanting to confront prejudice more often than they reported actually doing 
so. Research by Shelton and Stewart (2004) suggests that individuals cannot accurately forecast 
their actions regarding confronting prejudice. In Study 1, women read a hypothetical scenario in 
which a man asked them sexist questions or offensive/non-sexist questions during a job 
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interview. Despite the social costs involved with confronting, women reported that they were 
more likely to confront the sexist interviewer than the offensive/non-sexist interviewer. In a 
subsequent behavioral study, women participated in an in-person job interview. Even though 
women in the first study predicted that they would confront a sexist interviewer, women in Study 
2 were less likely to confront the sexist interviewer when the social costs were high (i.e., when 
women were told to imagine that the job was important, well-paying, and prestigious). 
Woodzicka and LaFrance (2001) found similar results when examining women’s responses to 
imagined versus actual sexual harassment during job interviews.  
When it comes to confronting prejudice, being an inclined abstainer can lead to a number 
of intrapersonal consequences. Rasinski, Geers, and Czopp (2013) found that when people who 
value confronting fail to act in the face of prejudice, they experience cognitive dissonance, which 
they attempt to vanquish by subsequently devaluing confronting or positively evaluating the 
perpetrator. Shelton and colleagues (2006) found that failing to confront prejudice can also lead 
to self-directed negative affect (e.g., guilt, shame) and increased rumination.  
Observers of prejudice, like targets, are also susceptible to this discrepancy between 
desired and actual confronting behaviors. Kawakami and colleagues (2009) found that observers 
significantly overestimated the amount of negative affect they would feel in response to 
overhearing a prejudiced comment; further, observers overestimated the extent to which they 
would ostracize the perpetrator. Crosby and Wilson (2015) found that not only do observers 
overestimate their negative affect and ostracism, but they also overestimated the extent to which 
they would confront a homophobic slur. 
Why does this gap persist? Observers may anticipate negative interpersonal consequences 
(Dickter & Newton, 2013) or social costs (e.g., Shelton & Stewart, 2004) of confronting, and 
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change their minds about confronting at the critical moment. Further, people overestimate how 
negatively they will feel when they overhear a prejudiced remark, and thus may fail to confront 
prejudice when the opportunity arises because they do not feel as bad about the prejudice as they 
had anticipated (e.g., Crosby & Wilson, 2015; Kawakami et al., 2009). Thus, self-regulatory 
problems that were not anticipated at the time of forming the intention to confront prejudice 
(e.g., changing one’s mind about confronting, not feeling upset like one had expected) can 
undermine the translation of one’s intention to confront into action.  
Bridging the Intention-Behavioral Gap with Implementation Intentions  
 
To increase the likelihood of converting intentions into behavior, goal intentions can be 
supplemented with implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). An implementation intention is 
an “if-then plan specifying when, where, and how the person will instigate responses that 
promote goal realization” (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, p. 70). These if-then plans link a goal 
intention (“I intend to confront prejudice!”) to a critical situation and a response that will be 
effective in realizing that intention (e.g., “If I hear someone make a prejudiced remark, then I 
will calmly confront the person – I will ask, ‘What did you mean by that?’”). A number of meta-
analyses have indicated that supplementing goal intentions with implementation intentions 
significantly improves rates of goal attainment (e.g., Adriaanse, Vinkers, De Ridder, Hox, & De 
Wit, 2011; Bélanger-Gravel, Godin, & Amireault, 2013; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Sheeran, 
2002). Implementation intentions predict behavior through a number of mechanisms; here, I 
focus on three of those mechanisms and then describe how implementation intentions can 
facilitate the confrontation of prejudice.  
Implementation intentions activate an implemental mindset. Dual-process models 
have been used to describe goal pursuit (Gollwitzer, 2012; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999). 
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Specifically, an individual searches for and selects a goal, and an individual implements and 
initiates goal-relevant behavior; these processes represent a deliberative mindset and an 
implemental mindset, respectively. While mere goal intentions can be “formed against the 
backdrop of deliberative mindsets” (Gollwitzer, Wieber, Myers, & McCrea, 2010, p. 149), 
forming implementation intentions activates an implemental mindset. Research has suggested 
that implemental mindsets provide an advantage over deliberative mindsets with respect to goal 
attainment. For example, Brandstätter and Frank (2003) induced an implemental mindset in 
people by making them create a plan for executing an uninitiated goal. These individuals, 
compared to those with a deliberative mindset, exhibited greater persistence on a goal-relevant 
behavior. Furthermore, Armor and Taylor (2003) found that people induced with implemental 
mindsets exhibited better performance on a task (i.e., a scavenger hunt) than those induced with a 
deliberative mindset. When people form implementation intentions, they adopt an implemental 
mindset, thereby focusing on striving for and achieving goals.  
Implementation intentions emphasize opportunities to act. The if component of 
implementation intentions specifies a critical situation or cue that evokes the goal-relevant 
behavior. Forming implementation intentions enhances the detection of opportunities to strive for 
a goal (Gollwitzer, 1999). For example, across three experiments, Webb and Sheeran (2004) 
showed that people who formed implementation intentions to identify a particular number (3) or 
letter (F) were more likely to correctly identify these numbers and letters in a computerized task 
than those who did not form an implementation intention. Similarly, Parks-Stamm, Gollwitzer, 
and Oettingen (2007, Study 1) found that people who formed implementation intentions to 
identify five-letter words in a recorded story were more able to detect these words than those 
who formed goal intentions. Furthermore, Webb and Sheeran (2008) also found that the effect of 
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implementation intentions on goal-relevant behavior was mediated by accessibility to goal-
relevant cues. These studies suggest that implementation intentions predict goal-relevant 
behavior because the formation of if-then plans helps people identify good opportunities to take 
action and perform the desired behavior. 
Implementation intentions automatize behavior. Implementations intentions create a 
mental link between the critical situation and the goal-relevant behavior, and in so doing, 
strategically automatize goal attainment (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Thus, 
when an individual makes a plan to take action in a given situation (e.g., overhearing a 
prejudiced remark and verbally confronting the perpetrator), initiation of the response is more 
immediate, more efficient, and requires less cognitive resources (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & 
Oettingen, 2011). Sheeran, Webb, and Gollwitzer (2005; see also Webb & Sheeran, 2006) stated 
that, “the moment people encounter the situational cue specified in the if component of their 
plan, the action specified in the then component is initiated in a mechanistic fashion” (p. 95). 
This automaticity spurred by implementation intentions can also be observed in studies 
examining response latency. A number of studies (e.g., Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; 
Parks-Stamm et al., 2007; Webb & Sheeran, 2004, 2007, 2008) have found that response latency 
mediates the effect of implementation intentions on goal attainment – that is, implementation 
intention leads to faster responses to a cue, which in turn leads to the desired behavior. 
Furthermore, studies using EEG and fMRI techniques suggest that after the link between the 
situation and behavior is created, performance of the desired behavior is activated by regions of 
the brain dedicated to automatic and nonconscious processes (Schweiger Gallo, Cohen, 
Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2013; Wieber, Thürmer, & Gollwitzer, 2014).  
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Using Implementation Intentions to Promote Confronting Prejudice 
 Previous research has examined how implementation intentions can be used to regulate 
one’s own prejudice (e.g., Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Mendoza, Gollwitzer, & Amodio, 2010; 
Stewart & Payne, 2008). Research by Gollwitzer and Brandstätter (1997) showed that people 
who formed implementation intentions to speak up against xenophobic remarks that were made 
in a video more quickly seized an opportunity to act than people who did not form an 
implementation intention. However, research has yet to examine the effect of implementation 
intention interventions on confronting prejudice in person.  
  As stated above, there is a prevalent gap between intentions and action with respect to 
confronting prejudice. When people observe prejudice, they often deliberate over whether to 
react, weighing the pros (i.e., reduced negative intrapersonal consequences) and cons (e.g., 
increased negative interpersonal consequences) and failing to confront. The fear of interpersonal 
consequences is a barrier to confronting observed prejudice; however, forming implementation 
intentions helps people to overcome competing goals and obstacles to goal attainment 
(Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998) differentiated 
between implementation intentions that were task-facilitating/action-focused and those that were 
barrier handling/reluctance-focused. The former type of plan is geared at automatizing action 
initiation so that potential barriers (e.g., fear of interpersonal consequences) no longer gain a grip 
on behavior.  Barrier-handling plans, on the other hand, are geared at managing obstacles to 
performance (e.g., feeling reluctant to respond) so that the intended behavior can proceed 
undisturbed. Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998) observed that both types of plan are effective at 
implementing goal-relevant behavior, and both types of plan are tested here. Implementation 
intentions activate an implemental mindset and should therefore help people initiate reactions to 
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observed prejudice or effectively manage obstacles such as reluctance that could undermine 
response initiation. Furthermore, because implementation intentions delegate control of the 
behavior to automatic processes, deliberation over whether or not to confront observed prejudice 
should be reduced in lieu of an immediate, planned response.  
  Implementation intentions should also facilitate confrontation by making it easier to 
detect prejudice. Understandably, if a remark is not interpreted as prejudiced, one is unlikely to 
believe that the remark deserves to be confronted. People are often poor at detecting prejudice 
from themselves (Pronin, 2007) and from others (Kaiser & Major, 2006; Major & Kaiser, 2005; 
Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Stangor et al., 2003). Because Whites are rarely the victims of 
racial prejudice, they may have difficulty detecting observed prejudice (Sue et al., 2007). When a 
person makes an if-then plan to confront prejudice, the if component of a plan (e.g., “If I hear a 
prejudiced remark…”) should make instances of observed prejudice more salient to observers, 
thereby giving them more opportunities to enact the behavior specified in the then component of 
the plan.  
 In sum, implementation intentions should help people overcome the self-regulatory 
obstacles to confronting prejudice. Even people with the best intentions may fail to take action if 
they lack relevant self-regulation strategies (e.g., Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009; Webb, Schweiger 
Gallo, Miles, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2012). However, self-regulation processes have been 
shown to bridge the gap between intentions and behavior (e.g., de Bruin et al., 2012). Thus, I 
propose the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: People who form implementation intentions to confront prejudice, 
relative to goal intentions or no intentions, will be more likely to verbally confront 
prejudice.  
  
 
17
Hypothesis 2: People who form implementation intentions to confront prejudice, 
relative to goal intentions or no intentions, will be more likely to ostracize the 
perpetrator.  
Hypothesis 3: People who form implementation intentions to confront prejudice, 
relative to goal intentions or no intentions, will exhibit more negative affect 
immediately after hearing a prejudiced remark.   
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 145 White students at the University of North Carolina. Six participants 
were excluded from analyses because of audiovisual errors (e.g., the video was inaudible). One 
participant was excluded from analyses because of experimenter error. Thus, analyses are 
reported for 138 participants (91 females, 44 males, 1 non-binary; Mage = 19.23 years, SDage = 
1.56 years). Some participants were recruited via the Introduction to Psychology SONA 
volunteer pool (N = 92) and were given class credit in exchange for their participation; the other 
participants responded to flyers posted around campus (N = 46) and were given $10 upon 
completion of the study.  
Design and Procedure 
 The current study employed a between-subjects design with four groups (goal intentions; 
action-focused implementation intention; reluctance-focused implementation intention; control). 
Participants signed up for a two-session study on “Individual vs. Group Decision Making.” 
Measures for Session one are listed in Appendix A; the protocol for Session 2 can be found in 
Appendix B. The average time between session 1 and session 2 was 12.16 days (SD = 9.76 
days). 
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Session 1. The purpose of Session 1 was twofold: to assess participants’ forecasted 
reaction to prejudice and to deliver the implementation intention manipulation. Participants 
signed up for a two-session study on “Individual vs. Group Decision Making.” In the first 
session (completed online via the Qualtrics survey software), participants were given the 
following cover story:  
Thank you for participating. The study is about individual and group decision-making. 
You will be asked to describe how you would navigate some interpersonal 
dilemmas. During this first session, each person will get a random selection of six 
situations to respond to. During the second session, you will come into the lab to make 
partner/group decisions about a random selection of six situations. In the second session, 
you will not necessarily discuss the same dilemmas that you see during this first 
session. We will be presenting some situations to you. Your task is to decide what you 
would do in the situation. For some situations, we will give you suggestions of what you 
could do. 
 
Participants then completed a survey in which they responded to six “interpersonal dilemmas,” 
including this target scenario about hearing someone make a prejudiced comment: 
Your parents are organizing a barbecue for family and friends. While the barbecue is 
getting set up, your father’s work colleague, Jhamal, arrives. He apologizes, saying that 
he couldn’t bring any food, but he did bring some paper plates and napkins. Paul, a 
family friend in is late 60s, quietly says to you, “Wow, really? I definitely expected him to 
say fried chicken or something like that. Black people are so cheap!!” Paul then laughs.  
 
After reading this target scenario, participants self-reported the likelihood that they would 
confront the prejudiced comment (1 = not at all likely, 7 = very likely).  
After responding to the target scenario, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions: goal intention (n = 40), action-focused implementation intention (n= 33), 
reluctance-focused implementation intention (n = 21), or a no-intention control condition (n = 
44). Those in the goal intention condition were asked to memorize and re-type the following 
goal:  
My goal is to calmly confront a person who makes a prejudiced remark and ask, “Why 
did you say that?! 
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Those in the action-focused implementation intention condition saw the same goal, and then 
were asked to memorize and re-type the following implementation intention: 
If I hear someone make a prejudiced remark, then I will calmly confront the person – I 
will ask, “Why did you say that?!” 
 
Participants in the reluctance-focused implementation intention condition were all given the 
following stem: 
 If I hear something prejudiced, then no excuses, no hesitation – I will say… 
Then, these participants were able to choose one of the following three phrases to complete the 
implementation intention: 
 “…are you serious?” 
 “…I don’t agree with that.” 
 “…I don’t think you should say that.” 
 
Participants were then asked to memorize and re-type their chosen implementation intention. 
Next, participants in the goal intention, action-focused implementation intention, and reluctance-
focused implementation intention conditions were asked, “How committed are you to this plan?” 
(1 = not at all committed, 7 = very committed). Participants in the no intention condition did not 
see a goal or plan to confront prejudice. 
The other five scenarios (see Appendix A) only served as filler material to enhance the 
cover story; thus, responses to these scenarios were not analyzed. After responding to all the 
scenarios, participants provided demographic information (age, gender, race, year in school, and 
political preference). Participants were then directed to a website to sign up for time to come in 
to the lab to complete the second session about “group decision-making.” 
Session 2. The purpose of Session 2 was to obtain behavioral measures of participants’ 
confrontation to prejudice. After arriving for the second session, participants were told to wait in 
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the hallway before their session started. One White confederate and one Black confederate also 
appeared in the hallway, acting as additional participants. The researcher came to collect the 
participant and confederates, and led them to the lab, in which a webcam was hidden to record 
the sessions. Participants and confederates were always arranged such that the participant was 
seated across from the White confederate, within view of the webcam. Soon after entering the 
room, the Black confederate and the researcher left the room under the pretense that the Black 
confederate had forgotten to sign a form; ostensibly, this held up the experiment. After the Black 
confederate and the researcher left the room (for an average duration of 76.81 seconds; SD = 
17.53 seconds), the White confederate made a prejudiced remark: “Typical Black [guy/girl], is 
he lazy or just stupid?” The White confederate was not scripted to make any further comment, 
though she was instructed to respond in a neutral, detached manner to anything the participant 
said. The participant’s verbal response to the prejudiced remark (or lack thereof) was our first 
outcome measure (0 = did not confront, 1 = confronted). For participants who did confront, the 
time (in seconds) between the prejudiced comment and their verbal confrontation was also 
measured (i.e., response latency).   
Next, the Black confederate and the researcher reentered the room. The researcher then 
mentioned that the experiment is a partner task, and then she prompted the participant to pick 
one of the confederates as a partner. Thus, the participant had a choice to pick either the White 
confederate who just made a racist remark or the Black confederate. Selecting the Black 
confederate (and, thus, ostracizing the White confederate) was operationalized as confronting 
prejudice (see Kawakami et al., 2009) and served as the second outcome measure (0 = White 
partner, 1 = Black partner). After the participant verbally indicated which person they wanted as 
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a partner, the experiment was over. The researcher then debriefed1 and compensated the 
participants. 
Two independent raters (κ = .76), both of whom were blind to experimental condition, 
coded participants’ verbal responses to the confederate’s prejudiced remark (0 = did not 
confront, 1 = verbally confronted). Examples of confronting include: “That’s rude,” “What did 
you mean by that?” or “What does race have to do with it?” The two independent raters (κ = .69) 
also coded whether or not participants exhibited suspicion (0 = no suspicion, 1 = suspicion). 
Examples of participants’ suspicious behavior included looking directly at the camera for long 
periods of time or verbally suggesting that the procedure was part of a cover story. For both 
confronting and suspicion, the raters coded the videos according to a codebook (see Appendix C) 
and disagreements between raters were settled by the author, who was also blind to condition. 
Additionally, two independent raters also coded participants’ non-verbal reactions during 
the first ten seconds after the prejudiced comment. Specifically, the raters used an affect grid 
(Russell, Weiss, Mendelsohn, 1989) to assess participants’ valence and arousal, which served as 
our third outcome measure. Valence scores ranged from -4 (very negative) to 4 (very positive); 
similarly, arousal scores ranged from -4 (very low energy) to 4 (very high energy). Inter-rater 
reliability was assessed by computing the two-way random, absolutely agreement, average-
measures intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for each dimension. The resulting ICC for 
valence indicated a high level of agreement across raters, ICC = .72; the resulting ICC for 
arousal indicated a fair level of agreement across raters, ICC = .48. Scores for each dimension 
were averaged across raters to obtain composite valence and arousal scores. 
                                                 
1Twenty-two participants received a funnel debriefing. These participants were probed for 
suspicion of the experiment’s true purpose. One participant reported, “I can tell there’s some 
acting” but did not mention prejudice. No other participants reported suspicion during the funnel 
debriefing. However, all participants were coded for suspicion by the independent raters. 
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Data Analyses 
 Participants’ responses in Session 1 and Session 2 were matched by their anonymous 
SONA ID numbers or by email addresses (which were then discarded). I first conducted a 
randomization check to assess whether participants’ demographic measures or experimental 
variables (i.e., days between sessions, opportunity to confront) differed significantly across the 
four conditions or across the two recruitment methods. Next, I examined the correlations 
between the outcome measures (verbal confrontation and partner selection) and all other 
measures. 
 Then, chi-square tests of independence were used to examine the association between 
condition and the outcome measures. To specifically examine the effect of the goal intention and 
implementation intention manipulations, two dummy variables were created: a goal intention 
variable (1 = goal intention condition, 0 = all other conditions) and an implementation intention 
variable in which the action-focused and reluctance-focused implementation intention conditions 
were combined to increase the power (1 =implementation intention conditions, 0 = all other 
conditions). I conducted logistic regression analyses with the two dummy variables 
simultaneously predicting two of the outcome measures (verbal confrontation and partner 
selection). I also conducted Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) on nonverbal reactions (i.e., affect 
and arousal).  
Additional analyses included ANOVAs to measure the effect of condition on response 
latency for participants who did confront. The additional analyses section also includes analyses 
excluding participants who exhibited suspicion.   
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Results 
Randomization Check 
 Participants did not differ on any demographic measures across conditions, Fs < 2.14, χ2s 
< 11.36, ps > .05. Participants in the reluctance-focused implementation intention condition (M = 
7.19 days, SD = 4.69 days) had a shorter delay between sessions than those in the other 
conditions, F (3, 134) = 3.42, p = .02, η2 = .07. This is likely due to the fact that data for 
participants in this condition were collected close to the end of the semester, resulting in less 
time to spare between sessions. Participants in the reluctance-focused implementation intention 
condition also had significantly less time to confront the perpetrator than participants in all other 
conditions, F (3, 133) = 3.28, p = .02, η2 = .07. Again, because data for these participants were 
collected near the end of data collection, I attribute this difference to research assistants’ 
impatience. Importantly, neither delay between sessions nor time available to confront was 
related to any of the outcomes assessed here (rs < .14, ps > .10). 
Correlations 
 Table 1 shows the correlations between all measures. Verbal confrontation was 
significantly correlated with Black partner selection, r = .22, p = .01, indicating that people who 
confronted the verbal remark were more likely to select the Black confederate as a partner. 
Verbal confrontation was also significantly correlated with both nonverbal valence (r = -.44, p < 
.001) and nonverbal arousal (r = .26, p = .002), indicating that people who verbally confronted 
the prejudiced remark exhibited more negative valence and higher levels of arousal in the ten 
seconds after the remark was made.  
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Rates of Verbal Confrontation 
 Table 2 shows how often participants confronted the prejudiced remark in each condition. 
Across all conditions, 26.8% (37/138) of participants verbally confronted; this included 40% of 
people (16/40) in the goal intention condition, 21.2% of people (7/33) in the action-focused 
implementation intention condition, 19% of people (4/21) in the reluctance-focused 
implementation intention condition, and 22.7% of people (10/44) in the control condition. A chi-
square test of independence showed that there was no significant association between condition 
and rates of verbal confrontation, χ2 (3, N = 138) = 5.09, p = .16.  
To assess the effect of the goal manipulation on rates of verbal confrontation, the dummy 
variables for both goal intentions and implementation intentions were entered as simultaneous 
predictors in a binomial logistic regression (see Table 3). These variables accounted for a 
marginally significant amount of variance in verbal confrontation, Nagelkerke R2 = .05, χ2 (2) = 
4.86, p = .09. The odds ratios indicated that participants who received the goal intention to 
confront prejudice were 2.27 times more likely to verbally confront the prejudiced remark than 
participants in the other conditions; this effect was marginally significant, OR = 2.27, 95% 
CI[0.88 – 5.84], Wald χ2 =2.87, p = .09. Conversely, the implementation intentions dummy 
variable was not a significant predictor of verbal confrontation, OR = 0.87, 95% CI[0.33 – 2.29], 
Wald χ2 =0.08, p = .77. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported: implementation intentions did not 
predict a significant increase in rates of verbal confrontation. On the contrary, forming goal 
intentions was a significantly stronger predictor of verbal confrontation than forming 
implementation intentions.  
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Partner Selection 
 Table 2 shows the frequency of participants who selected the Black confederate as their 
partner in each condition. Across all conditions, participants overwhelmingly chose the Black 
confederate: 77.5% (31/40) in the goal intention condition; 72.7% (24/33) in the action-focused 
implementation intention condition, 81% (17/21) in the reluctance-focused implementation 
intention condition, and 77.3% (34/44) in the control condition. A chi square test of 
independence revealed that there was no significant association between condition and partner 
selection, χ2 (3, N = 138) = 0.53, p = .91.  
To assess the effect of the goal manipulations on rates of selecting the Black partner, the 
dummy variables for both goal intentions and implementation intentions were entered as 
simultaneous predictors in a binomial logistic regression (see Table 4). These variables did not 
account for a significant amount of variance in partner selection, Nagelkerke R2 < .001, χ2 (2) = 
0.04, p = .98. The odds ratios indicate that neither goal intention (OR = 1.01, 95% CI[0.236 – 
2.82], Wald χ2 = 0.001, p = .98) nor implementation intention manipulations (OR = 0.93, 95% 
CI[0.36 – 2.38], Wald χ2 = 0.02, p = .88) significantly predicted partner selection. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
Nonverbal Reactions 
An ANOVA with three levels (goal intention; combined implementation intentions; and 
control) was conducted to assess the effect of the goal manipulation on participants' affect in the 
ten seconds following the prejudiced remark. Results revealed that condition has a significant 
effect on valence, F(2, 131) = 3.31, p = .04, η2 = .05. A post hoc Tukey test showed that 
participants in the implementation intention conditions (M = -0.34, SE = 0.20) reported 
significantly less negative affect than participants in the control condition (M = -1.06, SE = 0.18), 
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p < .05. None of the other pairwise comparisons were significant. There was no effect of 
condition on arousal ratings, F < 1.00, p > .05. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was rejected. Appendices D 
and E show the progression of valence and arousal, respectively, over time. Across all 
conditions, participants tended to exhibit less negative valence across time. Participants were at a 
high level of arousal immediately following the prejudiced remark, but quickly settled down and 
hovered around a neutral level of arousal within one minute of hearing the remark. 
Additional Analyses  
Response latency. I also measured the response latency for participants’ verbal 
confrontations. Among the 37 participants who did confront, they took an average of six seconds 
to do so (SD = 0.08). An ANOVA with three levels (goal intentions; combined implementation 
intentions; control) revealed no significant difference in response latency between the conditions, 
F < 1.00, p > .05.  
Participants exhibiting suspicion.  Twenty participants (14.5%) were coded as 
exhibiting suspicion. Suspicion rates did not differ significantly by condition (goal intentions = 
22.5%, combined implementation intentions = 14.8%, control = 6.8%), χ2 (2, N  = 138) = 4.16, p 
= .12. Suspicion was not related to rates of confrontation, χ2 (1, N  = 138) = 2.07, p = .18. Sixty 
percent of suspicious participants did not confront, whereas 40% did confront. Suspicion was 
related to partner selection, χ2 (1, N  = 138) = 4.34, p = .04. However, including suspicion in the 
logistic regression predicting partner selection did not alter the (non)significant effects of goal 
intention and implementation intention conditions.  
Discussion 
Given that past research has found that observers of prejudice rarely step in to confront, it 
is promising that over one-fourth (26.8%) of all participants in the current study confronted the 
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prejudiced remark, including 40% of those who formed a goal intention to do so. This is similar 
to findings from past research. Rattan and Dweck (2010) reported that 25.5% of their participants 
confronted prejudice, while Shelton and Stewart (2004) reported that 28.4% of their participants 
confronted prejudice. The rate of confrontation in the current study is also higher than the rates 
found in some studies – Swim and Hyers (1999) and Woodzicka and LaFrance (2001) found that 
only 16% of participants offered a direct, verbal confrontation in response to prejudice. 
However, the hypotheses were rejected: implementation intention interventions did not 
significantly increase rates of confrontation. In fact, mere goal intentions were enough to 
significantly increase verbal confrontation. Neither implementation intentions nor goal intentions 
significantly predicted whether or not participants selected a Black or White confederate for a 
partner task; across all conditions, over three-fourths of all participants selected the Black 
confederate. This stands in contrast to the findings of Kawakami and colleagues (2009), in which 
only 37% of participants who heard a racist comment subsequently selected the Black partner.  
Why Were Goal Intentions Effective and Implementation Intentions Ineffective? 
 Setting goals or forming goal intentions are central to numerous theories in social 
psychology (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Locke & Latham, 1990) and have been observed to improve rates 
of goal attainment in both correlational (Sheeran, 2002) and experimental studies (Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006). The present findings showing that the formation of goal intentions increased 
rates of behavioral performance provides valuable corroboration of these findings and does so in 
a novel context (confronting prejudice). Previous research has shown that implementation 
intentions generally outperform goal intentions with respect to eliciting goal-directed behavior. 
However, the results reported herein suggest that in the domain of confronting prejudice, 
implementation intentions are not as effective as mere goal intentions.  
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Why were implementation intentions ineffective? It may be that implementation 
intentions induced a deliberative mindset, that is, caused people to think about the best course of 
action. People with a deliberative mindset often reflect upon which goals to strive for and 
consider the desirability and feasibility of different goals (Gollwitzer, 2012; Gollwitzer et al., 
2010). Deliberative mindsets are most useful when a person is setting goals as they enable the 
person to decide upon the best course of action. Deliberative mindsets are less useful, however, 
when a person is trying to implement goal-relevant behavior because the person needs to take 
action rather than deliberate about what to do and potentially miss good opportunities to act 
(Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Ratajczak, 1990; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, 
& Steller, 1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987).  
 As implementation intentions take the form of an “if-then” plan, the wording of each 
component of the plan is important (Gollwitzer et al., 2010). Because implementation intentions 
work by linking the situation (the if component) to the behavior (the then component), both the 
situation and the behavior must be specific and unambiguous for the goal to be attained. In the 
current study, the then component of the plan was very specific – participants in the action-
focused implementation intention condition were told exactly what to say (“…I will calmly 
confront the person – I will ask, ‘Why did you say that?!’”) while participants in the reluctance-
focused implementation intentions chose their own specific response. However, the if component 
of the plan (“If I hear someone make a prejudiced remark…”) may have been too general for the 
implementation intention to produce the predicted effect. When the if component of an 
implementation intention is not specific enough, encountering the critical situation could induce 
a deliberative mindset. Gollwitzer and colleagues (2010) stated that, “forming more inclusive if-
components does not seem to represent a viable alternative to forming specific ones, at least 
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when the swift recognition of the situation is crucial for successful action initiation” (p. 143). 
 With respect to the wording of implementation intentions, Gollwitzer, Bayer, and 
McCulloch (2005) stated that, “People should specify the situation in the if-part to such a degree 
that a given situation will no longer raise the question of whether it qualifies as the critical 
situation or not” (p. 510). In the current study, taking action (i.e., confronting the White 
confederate’s remark) in response to the implementation intention was dependent on participants 
interpreting the remark as prejudiced. However, the if component of the plan used here may have 
been ambiguous and induced a deliberative mindset in participants, making them question 
whether the remark was prejudiced, and, thus, disrupting a confronting response.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The methods used in the current research were neither flawless nor exhaustive. Future 
research could make a number of improvements to better understand the role of goals and if-then 
plans in confronting prejudice.  
Lack of commitment to the plan or superordinate goal. One possible reason that the 
implementation intentions did not increase rates of verbal confrontation is that participants were 
not committed to the goal of confronting prejudice before encountering the plan. In the current 
study, participants who received an implementation intention reported that their commitment to 
the plan (M  = 4.53, SE = 0.21) was significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, t(51) = 
2.43, p = .02. However, when I used the dummy variable for implementation intentions to test 
whether the effect of the implementation intention intervention on verbal confrontation was 
moderated by commitment to the goal; the interaction term was not significant, OR = 0.72, Wald 
χ2 = 1.05, p = .31. Thus, lack of commitment to the plan does not appear to explain the non-
significant effects of implementation intentions observed here.  
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While I measured participants’ commitment to the plan they encountered in our study, I 
did not measure participants’ commitment to the broader goal of confronting prejudice. Research 
by Sheeran and colleagues (2005) found that the effects of implementation intentions are 
dependent on the presence of, and the commitment to, superordinate goal intentions – that is, 
implementation intentions increase the likelihood of goal attainment when there is already a 
strong (rather than moderate or weak) goal intention to perform a behavior. Implementation 
intentions are meant to bolster existing goal intentions (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). People who 
are not committed to confronting prejudice may have been less motivated to perceive the remark 
as prejudiced – that is, they may have been less likely to identify the critical cue that would have 
activated a response. Therefore, future research should account for participants’ commitment to 
the overarching goal of confronting prejudice.  
 Stronger behavior-goal link. In the current study, the goal was to confront prejudice; 
however, the behavior that was specified (i.e., asking the perpetrator, “What did you mean by 
that?”) may not have been strongly related to that goal. Some studies (e.g., Becker & Barreto, 
2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999) have shown that assertive responses to 
prejudice are less common and less favorable than nonassertive confrontations. In the current 
study, the suggested confrontation was a decidedly (and intentionally) nonassertive expression of 
dissatisfaction. However, people who formed implementation intentions may not have accepted 
the suggested response as a valid means to achieving their goal of confronting prejudice – that is, 
they may not have linked the behavior with their goal. Thus, a stronger, less ambivalent verbal 
confrontation (e.g., “That was prejudiced!”) may have made the implementation intention more 
effective.  
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 Increased motivation to confront. Finally, increasing a person’s motivation to confront 
observed prejudice could increase their likelihood of so doing. While past behavior does not 
always directly predict subsequent behavior (Ajzen, 1991, 2002; Ouellette & Wood, 1998), past 
failures to confront prejudice may motivate people to take action in the future. For example, 
research by Smallman and Roese (2009) found that content-specific counterfactual thinking 
predicts behavioral intentions (e.g., thinking “I should have confronted the prejudiced remark” 
leads to intentions to confront subsequent prejudice). Furthermore, Gollwitzer and colleagues 
(2010) have suggested that combining counterfactual thinking with implementation intentions 
can effectively bridge the intention-behavior gap. Future research could examine an intervention 
that combines upward counterfactual thinking (e.g., “I should have confronted the prejudiced 
remark.”) with implementation intentions to confront prejudice (e.g., “Next time I hear a 
prejudiced remark, I will immediately confront.”). This may be a more effective way to increase 
motivation to confront prejudice.  
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT; Rogers, 1983) also provides insight into how people 
become motivated to act. While PMT has been mainly used to understand responses to 
environmental and disease threats (see Floyd, Dunn, & Rogers, 2000), the theory can also be 
used to understand responses to social threats, such as expressions of prejudice. PMT suggests 
that, in part, motivation accrues from four factors: strengthened response efficacy, strengthened 
self-efficacy, weakened response costs, and enhanced moral norms.  
Response efficacy refers to the belief that a response will be effective in alleviating the 
threat. That is, motivation to confront prejudice is increased when people believe that their 
confrontation will be effective (Good et al., 2012; Rattan & Dweck, 2010; Stewart, Latu, 
Branscombe, & Denney, 2010). Self-efficacy is important for confronting prejudice because even 
  
 
32
if people believe that confronting prejudice will be effective, they may be unmotivated to 
confront because they lack confidence in their ability to execute the confrontation. Consistent 
with this idea, research suggests that individuals high in optimism are more likely to believe that 
their confrontation will be effective at reducing prejudice, and thus are more likely to confront 
prejudice (Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Sechrist, 2010; Wellman, Czopp, & Geers, 2009). Meta-
analyses of both correlational (Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000) and experimental studies 
(Sheeran et al., under review) indicate that self-efficacy is a powerful determinant of motivation. 
Thus, self-efficacy would seem to be an important target in interventions to increase the 
motivation to confront prejudice.  
Even high response efficacy and self-efficacy may not suffice to motivate confrontation, 
however, if observers perceive high response costs (i.e., if they believe that confronting will have 
negative consequences). If observers believe that they will be negatively evaluated (i.e., 
perceived as rude or impolite for confronting) or anticipate that perpetrators will retaliate against 
the confrontation (Dickter & Newton, 2013), they will likely be less motivated to confront 
prejudice. Although observers often anticipate that high response costs will result from 
confronting prejudice, confronting is actually beneficial for observers. A recent meta-analysis by 
Sheeran, Harris, & Epton (2014) found that decreasing perceived response costs (as well as 
increasing perceived response efficacy and perceived self-efficacy) leads to stronger behavioral 
intentions. Targeting response costs should thus be effective in influencing the motivation to 
confront prejudice.  
Finally, moral norms may be important when considering the confrontation of prejudice. 
Moral norms are “personal feelings of moral obligation or responsibility to perform, or refuse to 
perform, a certain behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 199). Observers may fail to confront prejudice 
  
 
33
because they do not feel morally responsible for so doing. A meta-analysis by Rivis, Sheeran, 
and Armitage (2009) found that moral norms are key predictors of intentions and motivation (see 
also de Gorsuch & Ortberg, 1983; Harland, Staats, & Wilke, 1999; Leeuw, Valois, & 
Houssemand, 2011; Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995). Godin, Conner, and Sheeran (2005) 
found that morally aligned intentions more strongly predict behavior than attitudinally aligned 
intentions – that is, when the intention is based on “based on the moral correctness of the 
behavior” rather than “the perceived consequences of acting” (p. 500). Directly measuring and 
manipulating a person’s moral norms regarding the confrontation of prejudice may increase the 
likelihood that forming implementation intentions will lead to confronting prejudice.  
Conclusion 
The current dissertation is a promising first step in examining how goal setting and 
implementation intention formation influences confronting prejudice. As goal intentions are 
effective at promoting the confrontation of prejudice, goal-setting should be added to the 
repertoire of action strategies for anti-racism trainings at schools and workplaces. Future 
research is necessary to further examine the underlying processes that fuel goal-oriented 
confrontation and to examine whether or how to effectively employ implementation intentions to 
make confronting prejudice a more automatic, less effortful task. Future interventions should 
also consider a more intensive approach to implementation intentions to confront prejudice – for 
example, using counterfactual thinking and motivational interventions to enhance the 
effectiveness of if-then plans. As Bethune suggested, to “acquiesce in the face of discrimination” 
is tantamount to supporting prejudiced actions; the current research provides a tactic for people 
to translate their nonprejudiced attitudes into anti-racist action.  
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Means (Standard Errors) 
 
 Goal 
Intention 
 
(n = 40) 
 
Action-focused 
Implementation 
Intention 
(n = 33) 
Reluctance-focused 
Implementation  
Intention 
(n = 21) 
Control 
 
 
(n = 44) 
 
Forecasted confronting 
 
 
4.35 (0.22) 
 
4.27 (0.31) 
 
3.90 (0.46) 
 
4.17 (0.27) 
Commitment to goal 
 
4.68 (0.25) 4.97 (0.28) 3.86 (0.29) --- 
Days between sessions 
 
15.17 (1.50) 11.09 (1.66) 7.19 (2.08) 12.59 (1.43) 
Opportunity to confront  
 
1:18 (0:02) 1:19 (0:03) 1:06 (0:02) 1:18 (0:02) 
Response latency  
 
0:06 (0:02) 0:03 (< 0:01) 0:07  (0:02) 0:07 (0:02) 
Age 19.30 (0.25) 19.48 (0.27) 19.28 (0.34) 18.95 (0.24) 
Political preference 3.60 (0.22) 3.59 (0.31) 4.52 (0.31) 3.74 (0.21) 
Note: Responses on the forecasted conditioning variable ranged from 1 to 7, with higher scores 
indicating a participant more strongly believes they would confront prejudice. Responses on the 
commitment to goal variable ranged from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating a stronger 
commitment to the goal intention or implementation intention. Responses on the political 
preference variable ranged from 1 to 7, with lower scores indicating a more liberal ideology and 
higher scores indicating a more conservative ideology.  
 
 
  
  
Table 2 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
  
Variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Verbal confrontation --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
2. Black partner selection .22* --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
3. Nonverbal – arousal .26* -.05 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
4. Nonverbal - valence -.44* -.20* .10 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
5. Forecasted confrontation .06 .04 .16 -.12 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
6. Commitment to goal .06 .004. .07 -.16 .36* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
7. Days between sessions .06 .05 .01 -.14 -.02 -.18 --- --- --- --- --- 
8. Opportunity to confront -.02 -.001 .05 -.03 .04 .14 .14 --- --- --- --- 
9. Gender -.01 .07 -.03 .26* -.18* -.26* -.19* -.08 --- --- --- 
10. Age .05 -.005 .02 .13 .09 .10 .09 -.03 .04 --- --- 
11. Political preference -.05 -.22* .05 .17* -.34* -.30* -.03 .01 .12 -.12 --- 
Note: *p < .05. The following variables were coded as dichotomous: verbal confrontation (0 = did not confront, 1 = verbally 
confronted); Black partner selection (0 = selected White partner, 1 = selected Black partner); gender (0 = female, 1 = male). Higher 
scores on the forecasted conditioning variable indicate that a participant more strongly believed they would confront prejudice. Higher 
scores on the commitment to goal variable indicated a stronger commitment to the goal intention or implementation intention. Lower 
scores on the political preference variable indicated a more liberal ideology; higher scores indicated a more conservative ideology.
3
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Table 3 
 
Percentage of Participants Who Verbally Confronted and Selected the Black Confederate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome variable 
Goal 
Intention 
 
 
(n = 40) 
 
Action-focused  
Implementation 
Intention  
 
(n = 33) 
 
Reluctance-
focused  
Implementation 
Intention  
(n = 21) 
 
Control 
 
 
 
(n = 44) 
 
Verbal confrontation 
 
 
16/40a 
(40%) 
 
7/33bc 
(21.2%) 
 
4/21ac 
(19%) 
 
10/44bc 
(22.7%) 
Black partner 
selection 
31/40a 
(77.5%) 
24/33a 
(72.7%) 
17/21a 
(81%) 
34/44a 
(77.3%) 
Note: Within each row, frequencies sharing the same superscript are not significantly different 
from each other at p < .10.  
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Table 4 
 
Logistic Regression: Condition Predicting Verbal Confrontation 
 
 
 
Predictor 
B SE Wald χ2 Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Model χ2 Nagelkerke 
R2  
 
     4.86† .05 
Condition: 
Goal intention 
vs. other 
 
0.82 0.48 2.87 2.27 † 
(0.88 – 5.84) 
  
Condition: 
implementation 
intention vs. 
other 
 
-0.14 0.49 0.08 0.87 
(0.33 – 2.29) 
  
Note. † p < .10. CI = Confidence Interval. Two dummy variables were used as simultaneous 
predictors: a dummy variable comparing goal intentions to all other conditions and a dummy 
variable comparing implementation intentions to all other conditions.   
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Table 5 
 
Hierarchical Logistic Regression: Condition Predicting Partner Selection  
 
 
 
Predictor 
B SE Wald χ2 Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Model χ2 Nagelkerke 
R2  
 
     0.04 <.001 
Condition: 
Goal intention 
vs. other 
 
0.01 0.52 0.001 1.01 
(0.36 – 2.82) 
  
Condition: 
implementation 
intention vs. 
other 
-0.08 0.48 0.02 0.93 
(0.36 – 2.38) 
  
Note. *p < .05. CI = Confidence Interval. Two dummy variables were used as simultaneous 
predictors: a dummy variable comparing goal intentions to all other conditions and a dummy 
variable comparing implementation intentions to all other conditions.   
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APPENDIX A: Measures for Session 1 
 
Are you currently enrolled in PSYC 101 (Introductory Psychology) or were you enrolled in 
PSYC 101 last semester (Fall 2014/Spring 2015)? 
 
Yes  No  [if yes, ineligible to participate] 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating. The study is about individual and group decision-making. You will 
be asked to describe how you would navigate some interpersonal dilemmas. During this first 
session, each person will get a random selection of six situations to respond to. During the 
second session, you will come into the lab to make partner/group decisions about a random 
selection of six situations. In the second session, you will not necessarily discuss the same 
dilemmas that you see during this first session. 
 
We will be presenting some situations to you. Your task is to decide what you would do in the 
situation. For some situations, we will give you suggestions of what you could do. 
 
Please be honest when responding.  
Remember, your responses are anonymous. 
 
------------------ 
 
 
1) You are having a few friends over to your house for a game night. Most of your 
friends are reserved about their political opinions, but you two of your friends, Jeff 
and Marissa, are on opposite ends of the political spectrum. They are both very 
forceful about their political opinions, and you forgot to consider this when inviting 
them both to game night. Someone makes a joke about the recent government 
shutdown, and sure enough, Jeff and Marissa start to argue about the issue, ruining 
the festive mood. How do you defuse the situation? 
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2) You are hanging out with some friends of yours. You see someone who you do not 
recognize, but you think the person is very attractive. You go up to introduce 
yourself, and you learn that his/her name is Taylor. While you originally came there 
to with your friends, you spend most of the night hanging out with Taylor. As the 
night ends, you get Taylor’s number and you both make a vague promise to see one 
another again. How long to you wait to contact Taylor and why? Do you text or call? 
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3) Your parents are organizing a barbecue for family and friends. While the barbecue is 
getting set up, your father’s work colleague, Jhamal, arrives. He apologizes, saying 
that he couldn’t bring any food, but he did bring some paper plates and napkins. Paul, 
a family friend in is late 60s,, quietly says to you, “Wow, really? I definitely expected 
him to say fried chicken or something like that. Black people are so cheap!!” Paul 
then laughs.  
 
 
How likely would you be to confront Paul about his comment? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all                     Very likely 
 
How likely are you to change the subject? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all                     Very likely 
 
How likely are you to subsequently avoid Paul? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all                     Very likely 
 
------------------ 
 
Goal intention: Thinking more broadly than just Paul’s particular comment, here is a plan to 
confront prejudice. Please say the following sentence to yourself three times. Please do not go 
on to the next page until you can repeat your plan twice without making a mistake – and without 
looking at the screen.  
 
 “My goal is to calmly confront a person who makes a prejudiced remark and ask, 
‘What did you mean by that?’ ” 
 
Please re-type the goal: My goal is to __________________________ 
 
------------------ 
 
Action-focused implementation intention: Thinking more broadly than just Paul’s particular 
comment, here is a plan to confront prejudice. Please say the following sentence to yourself 
three times. Please do not go on to the next page until you can repeat your plan twice without 
making a mistake – and without looking at the screen.  
 
 “If I hear someone make a prejudiced remark, then I will calmly confront the person – 
I will ask, ‘What did you mean by that?’ ” 
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Please re-type the plan: If _______________, then  _______________ 
 
------------------ 
Reluctance-focused implementation intention: Thinking more broadly than just Paul’s particular 
comment, here is a plan to confront prejudice. Please select the option below that you feel you 
would be most likely to say.  
 
 
“If I hear something prejudiced, then no excuses, no hesitation - I will say...” 
 
- Are you serious? 
- I don’t agree with that. 
- I don’t think you should say that. 
 
 
Please re-type the plan: If _______________, then  _______________ 
 
------------------ 
 
How committed are you to this plan/goal? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely no          Definitely yes 
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4) Your older brother has a well-paying job that makes him suffer very few financial 
burdens. However, you begin to notice him talking about how he doesn’t have money 
to do things he used to be able to do, like go see a movie or go out to eat. He still has 
his job, so you wonder what the problem is. While you’re at his house, you see an 
open drawer at his desk. In that drawer, you find a little black notebook with names, 
dates, and large dollar amounts (~ $10,000). You also see a book on how to win at 
poker. You begin to think that your brother has gone into debt because he may have a 
gambling problem.  
 
How likely would you be to confront your brother about his gambling problem? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very unlikely to confront                 Very likely to confront 
 
More generally, would you confront someone you know who has a gambling problem? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely no                     Definitely yes 
 
------------------ 
 
Here is a plan for confronting your older brother. Please say the following sentence to yourself 
three times. Please do not go on to the next page until you can repeat your plan twice without 
making a mistake – and without looking at the screen.  
 
 
“As soon as I get the chance, I calmly confront my brother and ask ‘What’s going on that 
you’re not telling me?!’” 
 
Please re-type the plan: As soon as I get the chance, I _______________ and ask ____________ 
 
How much do you think you could commit to this plan? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely no          Definitely yes 
 
------------------ 
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5) You have arranged a first date with someone for tonight at 7:00pm at a restaurant on 
W. Franklin Street. You have dressed up very nicely, and you are very anxious, but 
excited. You walk into the restaurant at 6:55pm and are promptly seated by a host. By 
7:03pm, your date still has not arrived – you just chalk it up to being fashionably late. 
However, the time ticks by and, eventually, you notice that it is 7:31pm and your date 
has still not arrived. You check your phone and see that you haven’t received any 
calls or texts. What do you do? 
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6) You are on the 7th floor of the library working on a group project with your friends 
Brandon and Rebecca, who are dating each other. You have been friends with both of 
them since the first week of college. Rebecca gets up to go down to the reference 
desk to ask a few questions about finding articles online. While she is gone, you 
notice Brandon slide over to be closer to you, and you also feel his leg rest against 
yours under the table. As he leans over to look at your computer, he puts his arm 
around your shoulder and gets a bit too close. You realize that he is flirting with you. 
How do you respond? 
 
 
How likely are you to tell Rebecca? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very unlikely                     Very likely  
 
How likely are you to subsequently avoid Brandon?  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all                     Very likely 
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Demographic Information 
 
It is helpful to us to know something about the kinds of people who are participating in our 
studies.  Please complete the demographic information below.  Again, all of your responses will 
be kept completely confidential. 
 
Gender:   Male  Female 
 
Race:  
_____ White/Caucasian 
_____ Black/African-American 
_____ Hispanic/Latino 
_____ East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese) 
_____ South Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani, Burmese) 
_____ Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian 
_____ Other (please specify_______________________) 
 
Age: _____________ 
 
Political Preference: [strongly liberal – strongly conservative] 
 
Year in school:   1 2 3 4 5+ 
 
Major or intended major: _____________________________ 
 
 
Please enter your email address: _________________ 
 
------------------ 
 
On the next page, you will get a link to sign up for the second session. Remember, in the second 
session, you will come into the lab and participate in a group-decision making task with a 
random selection of dilemmas. You will not necessarily see the same dilemmas that you saw in 
this first session.  
 
 
Here is a link to sign up for the second session. Remember, you will receive your compensation 
when you have completed the second session. We will send you an email reminder 24-48 hours 
prior to your second session.  
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APPENDIX B: Session 2 protocol 
- The two confederates and the participants will be seated in the third floor lobby.  
 
- The experimenter will go to the lobby to retrieve the participant and confederates.  
o Experimenter: “Is anyone here for the Group Decision Making task in room 
310? [after participant/confederates raise hands] You can follow me.” 
 
- Lead them into the room and ask them to have a seat. Ensure that the seating arrangement 
is such that the participant is seated on one side of the table, facing the two confederates 
on the other side of the table.   
 
- Once everyone is seated, the experimenter will say: 
 
o Experimenter: “Okay, before we start, are any of you participating for credit for 
PSYC499?” 
o Black confederate: [raises hand] “Me.” 
o Experimenter: “Did you bring your permission form?” 
o Black confederate: What permission form? 
o Experimenter: “The PSYC 499 form that I have to sign before you can 
participate?” 
o Black confederate: “Oh…no, I totally forgot…” 
o Experimenter: “Well…I need to sign that before we can start the study” 
o Black confederate: “Oh…” 
o Experimenter: “(sigh) I think I might have a copy of the form in our other lab. 
Come with me, you can sign it in there.” 
 
(During this exchange, a look of annoyance gradually overcomes the  
White confederate’s face.)  
 
- The Black confederate then gets up and follows the experimenter out of the lab. Once 
they have left the lab, they will actually go around to a graduate student office for about 
1-2 minutes.  
 
- After the Black confederate and the experimenter have left the lab, the White confederate 
will turn to the participant and say, 
 
o White confederate: “Typical black guy/girl, is he lazy or just stupid?” 
o If the participant confronts the confederate, the confederate can say things 
like: 
 “So how long do you think we’re going to be here?” 
 “Well, he’s making us stay here longer, I’m trying to get this done.” 
 “Oh, I don’t know…” 
 Start another conversation 
 Don’t apologize, but remain calm 
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- After the Black confederate and the experimenter return, the experimenter will say: 
o Experimenter: [to the Black confederate] “ [to all] Okay, so this study is going to 
be about group decision-making. This is supposed to be a partner task. However, 
there are only three of you…I guess you [pointing to the participant] can pick one 
of them [pointing to the confederates] to be your partner. I’ll be the other person’s 
partner.  
 
[If the participant asks what the partner task will be about…Experimenter: It’s a 
group decision-making task. You’ll get more instructions as you progress through 
the study.] 
 
• After the participant picks a partner… 
o Experimenter: Okay, before we start the group decision ask, the IRB ethics 
board requires that participants fill out a participant experience form. Please take 
two or three minutes to complete this.  
o Pass out the Participant Experience Forms and pens.  
 
 
• Experimenter: “Okay, the experiment is actually over now. There is no partner 
task. Here is a debriefing form to let you know what the experiment was really 
about. We are sorry that we had to deceive you, please read this form and let me 
know if you have any questions. [then participant reads form].” 
•   [If the participant has a question, either use your best judgment or refer them to 
Keenan (email address on debriefing form) if you feel uncomfortable answering 
their question.] 
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APPENDIX C: Codebook for Raters 
 
Date of coding What date are you coding this video? 
ID number What is the ID number on the video?  
Date of session 1 On what day did the participant complete the online session in 
Qualtrics? 
Date of session 2 On what day did the participant complete the videotaped behavioral 
session? 
Days between sessions How many days passed between session 1 and session 2? 
Black confederate Who was the Black confederate in the videotaped session? (Diego or 
Simone) 
White confederate Who was the prejudiced confederate in the videotaped session? 
Time of comment Mark the timestamp at the end of the prejudiced comment.  
Verbal response 
(yes/no) 
Did the participant provide a verbal response challenging the 
prejudiced remark? (e.g.,....) 
Time of verbal 
response 
Mark the timestamp at the beginning of the participant’s response.  
Response text What did the participant say to challenge the prejudiced remark? 
Time of confederate 
reentry 
Mark the timestamp at the time that the door to the room opens and 
the confederates reenter.  
Partner selection Who did the participant choose in the partner task? 
Suspicion (yes/no) Did the participant show suspicion about the true purpose of the 
study? 
Verbal suspicion If the participant showed suspicion, did they say something to display 
their suspicion? 
Suspicion text If the participant said something to display their suspicion, what did 
they say? 
Suspicion timestamps Mark the timestamp(s) where suspicion was displayed, verbally or 
nonverbally.  
Coder comments Please write any additional comments here.  
 
 APPENDIX D: PLOT OF TIME BY VALENCE FOR ALL CONDITIONS 
 
 
 
Note: Valence scores were coded on affect grids by independent raters; possible scores ranged from -4 (negative) to 4 (positive). T1 
indicates the first ten seconds after the prejudiced remark was made. The sample size for each time point on the x-axis is not the same, 
as some videos were longer than others.   
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 APPENDIX E: PLOT OF TIME BY AROUSAL FOR ALL CONDITIONS 
 
 
 
Note: Arousal scores were coded on affect grids by independent raters; possible scores ranged from -4 (low arousal) to 4 (high 
arousal). T1 indicates the first ten seconds after the prejudiced remark was made. The sample size for each time point on the x-axis is 
not the same, as some videos were longer than others.   
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